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MAREN KOSS
The Pro-Palestinian Transnational Advocacy Network
in Malaysia
Cooperation and Underlying Motives of Hamas and UMNO
ABSTRACT
A powerful pro-Palestinian transnational advocacy network has emerged in
Malaysia since the Gaza war of 2008–09. Taking the cooperation between the
Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia, the Islamist Hamas, and the
United Malays National Organisation as an example, I analyze the network
and argue that the three actors are engaging there to promote the Palestinian
struggle for an independent state but at the same time, each actor is using the
network to pursue its own interests.
K E Y W O R D S : PCOM, Hamas, UMNO, pro-Palestinian TAN, pro-
Palestinian NGOs
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2017, the day after US President Donald Trump announced
his decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (Trump 2017), mass
demonstrations erupted in Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur. Led by Khairy
Jamaluddin, then minister of youth and sports, more than a thousand Ma-
laysians protested in front of the US embassy and demanded that Trump
rescind his decision (Ziinine 2017). Similar demonstrations were organized
by Malaysia’s political opposition and the government the following two
Fridays. On December 22, Malaysia’s then-prime minister, Najib Razak,
even led a demonstration (Leon 2017). As Muslims constitute 69.1% of the
population in Malaysia (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2018) and the
Palestinian cause has a special meaning to all Muslims in the world (Pew
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Research Center 2007, 55–56; Rane 2010, 191–93), the demonstrations were
not surprising. More striking is that the United Malays National Organisa-
tion (UMNO), at that time the strongest political party in Malaysia’s then-
ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN),1 and pro-Palestinian NGOs
demonstrated alongside each other. Some of the NGOs not only followed
the call of then-Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi to join the
protests (Yunus and Shahar 2017) but also helped organize them (Muslim
Imran 2017a) and joined Prime Minister Najib on stage (Hamidi 2017).
This close cooperation between the ruling UMNO and pro-Palestinian
NGOs was not new. Rather, their joint protest of Trump’s Jerusalem deci-
sion demonstrates the existence of a pro-Palestinian transnational advocacy
network (TAN) in Malaysia, which consists of pro-Palestinian NGOs, the
Palestinian Islamist Hamas, and Malaysian politicians. Taking the coopera-
tion between the Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia (PCOM, an
officially registered NGO), Hamas, and UMNO as an example, I analyze the
overall cooperation of the actors involved in the pro-Palestinian TAN in
Malaysia as well as their underlying political motives and interests. I argue
that the three different actors engage in the TAN to jointly promote the
Palestinian struggle for their own state; at the same time, however, each
makes use of the TAN to pursue its own interests.
This research is interesting first because the pro-Palestinian TAN in Ma-
laysia has not been comprehensively analyzed; and second, because it brings
new insights into TANs in regions beyond the West. This has not been
a primary concern of scholars of International Relations Theory yet.
PCOM was chosen as a case to understand the political motives and
interests of the NGOs involved in the network because it is among the most
important pro-Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia and at the same time among
those with the clearest political orientation. Other NGOs, including
MyCare, Viva Palestina Malaysia, and the Malaysian Relief Agency, concen-
trate more on humanitarian assistance.2 To look at UMNO as the Malaysian
1. A UMNO-led alliance (since 1974, the BN) had governed Malaysia since the country’s
independence in 1957. It lost power for the first time in Malaysia’s post-independence history in May
2018, when Mahathir Mohamad’s Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) became the strongest party in
the Malaysian general elections.
2. Interviews in Kuala Lumpur: Representative of Malaysian Relief Agency, February 2, 2018;
representative of Viva Palestina Malaysia, February 2, 2018; representative of PCOM, February 5,
2018, representative of MyCare, February 6, 2018.
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party involved in the network makes sense given the organization’s dominant
political role since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957.
To conduct the analysis I use qualitative content analysis and draw on
primary data consisting of interviews with representatives from pro-
Palestinian NGOs, which I conducted in Malaysia in early 2018.3 I also draw
on primary sources—written material and photos—from the social media
accounts and online appearances of the actors analyzed in the article. The
material and the analysis both end in April 2018, because the impact of
the groundbreaking results of the May 2018 Malaysian general election on
the pro-Palestinian TAN is hard to evaluate, even today.4
THE PRO-PALESTINIAN TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORK
IN MALAYSIA
Transnational Advocacy Networks and Civil Society in Malaysia
Transnational Advocacy Networks
The place in which actors meet and transnationally engage for a common
cause was defined as a “transnational advocacy network” by International
Relations researchers in the late 1990s. Drawing on constructivism and social
movement theory, Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed the concept of a TAN
in their pioneering work, which many international relations researchers take
as a starting point even today. Keck and Sikkink argue that in a TAN all those
actors come together that work “internationally on an issue [and] are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of
information and services” (2). They underline that such a network spans
national and transnational realms, and that “advocacy captures what is
unique about these transnational networks: they are organized to promote
causes, principled ideas, and norms” (8). The authors define topics such as
3. I translated all direct quotations from Arabic original documents into English. To guarantee
the personal security of my interview partners, I refer to them anonymously, by affiliation only. The
interviews were conducted in English and anonymized based on a numeric scheme.
4. In the May 2018 general election, Mahathir Mohamad’s Pakatan Harapan became the
strongest party in Malaysia. This ended the reign of the BN coalition and the UMNO, with Ma-
hathir Mohamad, then 92 years old, the new prime minister. Mahathir had already been prime
minister from 1981 to 2003, at that time as a member of the UMNO. In early 2018 he had announced
that he would run for PM again, but this time as an opposition candidate. Mahathir had criticized
then-PM Najib Razak (of the UMNO) for being involved in far-reaching corruption scandals. For
more information see BBC (2018), Encyclopaedia Britannica (2018), and Milner (2017, 173–74).
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human rights, the environment, and women’s rights as issue areas in which
TANs engage (9) and try to change the behavior of states or international
organizations, or promote norm implementation (2–3).
Civil Society in Malaysia
Malaysia’s political system has been characterized as semi-democratic (Case
1993) or an illiberal democracy (Weiss 2006, 5); political liberties and civil
rights are restricted in the country (Ufen 2013, 6; Weiss and Hassan 2003, 6).
Nevertheless, civil society activists have some room to maneuver (Weiss and
Hassan 2003, 5–12), and a vibrant civil society scene has emerged since the
1990s (Uhlin 2016, 52). However, the space for NGOs has been limited,
especially since the ruling coalition BN lost its two-thirds majority in the
2008 elections, for the first time in Malaysia’s post-independence history
(Khoo 2018, 149). The NGO Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih)
had accused the government of manipulating the electoral process in favor of
the UMNO and had organized large demonstrations, which contributed to
the electoral loss of the BN (Khoo 2018, 149; Ufen 2013, 7). However, the
relationship between the state and NGOs in Malaysia is not characterized by
repression only. The government collaborates with NGOs, especially those in
development politics, which often complement state programs. But it limits
political NGOs, which it accuses of linking up with opposition parties or
being controlled by foreign agents (Weiss and Hassan 2003, 11; Hooi 2013, 82;
Ismail and Abadi 2017, 548–52). And yet, pro-Palestinian NGOs are treated
differently. Regardless of whether they engage in politics or in development
affairs, the Malaysian government collaborates with them, and they are able
to work in an open civil space.
Pro-Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia
Ever since it achieved independence in 1957, Malaysia has traditionally been
an important supporter of the Palestinian cause, but it was especially the 1967
Israeli–Arab war that raised awareness of the Palestinian cause in the Malay-
sian population (Robani 2007, 48). In 1981 Malaysia was the second country
to grant full diplomatic status to the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), and in 1989 it recognized the PLO’s office as the official Embassy
of Palestine in Malaysia (Nair 1997, 206; Robani 2007, 68). In recent years,
the Malaysian government, which does not have diplomatic relations with
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Israel (Harun 2009, 31), has strengthened its relationship with Palestinian
political actors beyond the secular Fatah and PLO and in particular has built
strong relations with the Islamist Hamas. High-ranking Hamas politicians
have regularly visited the annual general assembly of the UMNO (Middle
East Monitor 2017; PCOM 2015a). During his term in office, former Malay-
sian Prime Minister Najib Razak also visited the Gaza Strip, which is under
control of Hamas. In Gaza he was welcomed by Ismael Haniyeh, at that time
prime minister of the Hamas government (Zeiger and AP 2013).
Besides the political support the Palestinians have from Malaysia and the
close contacts the government in Kuala Lumpur has with various Palestinian
political actors, a very large and vibrant scene of pro-Palestinian NGOs has
emerged in Malaysia since 2008.5 Salleh et al. (2017, 133) say that Malaysian
NGOs “are well-known as being among the most active non-state actor
groups in the world that support Palestine.” The pro-Palestinian NGO Viva
Palestina Malaysia (2016) explains that the 2008–09 war between Israel and
Gaza was the turning point for Malaysian civil society activists to engage for
the Palestinian cause: “In the aftermath of the Gaza massacre on 27 Decem-
ber 2008, 50 Malaysian NGOs united to champion the Palestinian cause. The
Coalition of Malaysian NGOs against Persecution of Palestinians (COM-
PLETE) formed on 5 Jan 2009, cuts across religious, racial and political
barriers.” Most of the other pro-Palestinian NGOs were also founded around
that time, including PCOM in 2011,6 Aqsa Syarif Berhad (one of MyCare’s
six agencies) in 2010, the Malaysian Relief Agency in 2009–10, and the
Al-Quds Foundation Malaysia in 2012 (Al-Quds Foundation Malaysia 2018).
Most of them stress that they are apolitical and cross-sectarian and have
good relationships with diverse politicians in Malaysia and the Palestinian
territories. They argue that this enables them to gain the support of the whole
Malaysian population, beyond ethnic affiliations.7 In reality, however, some
of the NGOs have a clear political orientation, as well as close relations to
5. In summer 2017, after Israel had limited access by Muslims to the al-Aqsa mosque in Jer-
usalem following a terrorist attack by a Palestinian on two Israeli policemen, 22 pro-Palestinian
Malaysian NGOs initiated the Save Al-Quds campaign in Kuala Lumpur. In December 2017, 47
NGOs wrote an open letter to US President Trump which condemned his decision to recognize
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In both cases, some of the NGOs have a clear Palestinian orientation,
and others have a more Islamic or humanitarian focus. For more, see Citizens International (2017)
and Palestinian Information Center (2017).
6. Interview: Representative of PCOM, February 5, 2018, Kuala Lumpur.
7. Interviews: Representative of PCOM, representative of MyCare.
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Malaysian politicians. This is clear from the composition of their boards of
trustees. Next to the civil society activists, on the boards of trustees of some of
the pro-Palestinian NGOs, Malaysian politicians hold important positions,
sometimes even the chair. And the politicians on these boards are affiliated
with various political parties, which even oppose each other, such as the
UMNO, the Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS), and its splinter party
Amanah (Al-Quds Foundation Malaysia 2018; PCOM 2013a, 11–12).8 Even
though some of the NGOs are in fact co-opted by Malaysian politicians, all of
them clearly understand themselves as independent NGOs and as advocacy
groups (MyCare 2018; PCOM 2018a; Viva Palestina Malaysia 2016, 2–3).
The pro-Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia are also well connected to political
and civil society actors in the Palestinian territories. Although they say that
they are only interested in providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestin-
ians, most of them have a very close relationship to the Islamist Hamas,
which has ruled the politically and economically isolated Gaza Strip since
2007 (Viva Palestina Malaysia 2018a; Zeiger and AP 2013).9
THE PRO-PALESTINIAN TAN IN MALAYSIA: A COMMON CAUSE
BUT INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS?
Advocacy and Politics: The Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia
PCOM is among the most important and the most political pro-Palestinian
NGOs in Malaysia. It describes itself as an independent NGO (PCOM
2018a) and says its main official interest is advocacy of the Palestinian cause
in Malaysia and the Palestinian struggle for an independent state. The orga-
nization understands itself as a platform for the Palestinians and Malaysians
to engage in a mutual relationship.10 PCOM underlines that it has neither
a political orientation nor a religious affiliation, because it does not want to
8. Interview: Representative of PCOM.
9. After Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections in the Palestinian territories, disputes
emerged between the Islamist Hamas and the secular Fatah. Although the two organizations had
built a national unity government in 2007, new disputes between them erupted again in the same
year and led to a bloody brother war, followed by the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas.
All attempts at reconciliation since then have failed. The Palestinian territories are now divided
between the West Bank, led by the Palestinian National Authority (which is controlled by Fatah),
and the politically and economically isolated Gaza Strip, where Hamas maintains an increasingly
authoritarian political order. For more, see Asseburg (2007).
10. Interview: Representative of PCOM.
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get caught between different political camps, but aims to be open to the whole
Malaysian population, independent of religious and ethnic affiliations.11
It is PCOM’s mission to “present the true picture of the Palestinian
Cause to the Malaysian government, society and media so that we become
a recognized reference on the developments of the Cause and the suffering
and hopes of the Palestinian people” (PCOM 2018a, 2). It “aims at devel-
oping new links with the Malaysian people and government in order to
serve the Palestinian Cause” (4). PCOM underlines its strong focus on
advocacy in the introduction posted on its website. This document lists
PCOM’s main goals, including raising awareness of the Palestinian ques-
tion in Malaysia; improving interactions between Malaysians and Palestin-
ians; communicating the Palestinian issue to Malaysian officials, the media
and the public; and mobilizing support for the Palestinian question among
the Malaysians (3). To promote advocacy, PCOM organizes various activ-
ities in Malaysia, such as Palestinian Advocacy Week in August 2017
(PCOM 2017a, 2017b).
PCOM is well connected within both Malaysia and the Palestinian terri-
tories. In Malaysia, PCOM has close links to politicians of various political
parties. Its board of trustees includes politicians from different, even opposed,
parties. Seri Shahidan Kassim of the UMNO, who served as a minister in the
Prime Minister’s Department from 2013 until 2018, has been the head of the
board of trustees at least since 2013 (PCOM 2013a, 11).12 Thanks to his dual
role, PCOM had direct access to the center of the Malaysian government.
At the same time, politicians from the Islamist PAS and its splinter party
Amanah, both opposition parties at the time of my interviews, were also
members of PCOM’s board of trustees.13 However, the other members
besides those I mention in this study (Seri Shahidan Kassim, Abdul Latiff
Mirasa, and since 2018 Saifuddin Nasution Ismail) remain anonymous. Their
11. Interview: Representative of PCOM.
12. It was not possible to ascertain whether PCOM elected a new head for its board after the BN
and UMNO were ousted from power in the 2018 elections. What is clear, however, is that Saifuddin
Nasution Ismail, of the People’s Justice Party and minister of domestic trade and consumer affairs in
the new Mahathir government, was elected to the board in July 2018. At the same time, former
Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Hamidi, from the UMNO, who had been PCOM’s patron since its
founding, was replaced by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (see conclusion of the article). As these changes
took place, it is possible that Seri Shahidan Kassim also was replaced as the head of the board. For
more, see PCOM (2018b).
13. Interview: Representative of PCOM.
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names did not appear on PCOM’s website, in its publications and social
media, or in speeches, traditional media, or academic articles. The PCOM
representative I interviewed refused to mention their names. He only said
that the board of trustees includes members from various political parties. He
referred to the People’s Justice Party, PAS, UMNO, and Amanah, and also to
“public figures” in Malaysia. This secrecy contrasts with other pro-Palestinian
NGOs in Malaysia, including the Al-Quds Foundation Malaysia (2018) and
Viva Palestina Malaysia (2018b), which openly publish the names and affilia-
tions of their board of trustees members.
On the Palestinian side, PCOM is closely linked to Hamas. This becomes
clear in comparing the logos of the two organizations (Hamas 2017a, 1;
PCOM 2018a, 1). At the top of each logo is a shape representing historical
Palestine (today’s Israel and the Palestinian territories), in green. Green is
known as the color of Islam and very often used by Muslim or Islamist
political actors, including Hamas and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the
center of each logo is the al-Aqsa mosque of Jerusalem. The Hamas logo is
bounded by two Palestinian flags crossed by swords; PCOM’s logo has
a Malaysian flag on the left and a Palestinian flag on the right, which are
linked at the bottom by two hands clasping each other. At the bottom of each
logo is some text placed along a curve. The Hamas logo has the words
Palestine and Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Move-
ment, for which Hamas is the acronym). The PCOM logo has its name,
Palestinian Cultural Organization—Malaysia. The logos are clearly very sim-
ilar, just adapted to two specific contexts.
The connection between the two organizations becomes more apparent in
PCOM’s use of social media. PCOM’s chairman, Muslim Imran Abu Umar
(Muslim Imran), is of Palestinian nationality and openly shows his affiliation
with Hamas on his Twitter page. He frequently tweets pictures of himself
with high-ranking Hamas officials, such as Ismael Haniyeh, current head of
Hamas’ Political Bureau (Muslim Imran 2018a); Izzat al-Rishaq and Usama
Hamdan, both members of the Political Bureau; and Maher Salah, the head
of the Hamas movement overseas (Muslim Imran 2017b). He tweeted about
his happiness on the visit of “the brothers Mahar Salah and Izzat al-Rishaq in
Kuala Lumpur” (Muslim Imran 2017c). When asked about PCOM’s relation
to Hamas in a personal interview, the PCOM representative said that the
NGO has no political orientation. He did not deny, however, that PCOM
has close contacts with Hamas.
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In the content of its official website, one can distinguish two different
threads. First, there is content originating with PCOM. Here, PCOM em-
phasizes its advocacy work and encourages support for the Palestinian cause
in Malaysia (Muslim Imran 2015; PCOM 2018a).14 The material criticizes
Israel as a Zionist project, for being an apartheid regime, and for its brutal
wars on Gaza (PCOM 2014), but it does not question Israel’s right of exis-
tence. The second kind of content is external material, which comes directly
from Hamas’s English website. PCOM does not say that this material comes
from Hamas, but it is clear when the two websites are compared (Hamas
2018a, 2018b; PCOM 2018c, 2018d). And this material is much more critical
of Israel. Indeed, it takes Hamas’s stance of Palestinian (armed) resistance to
Israel (Koss 2018, 101–02; PCOM 2018e). PCOM’s website also offers key
Hamas political documents, including “A Document of General Principles &
Policies,” published by Hamas in May 2017 as the first political program since
the release of its 1988 charter.
PCOM’s close connection to Hamas has repercussions for the intra-
Palestinian power struggle between Hamas and the secular Fatah. It is
remarkable that PCOM has no links at all to Fatah. Its publications and
social media never mention Fatah. Diplomats with the Palestinian embassy in
Kuala Lumpur, which is run by the Palestinian National Authority and thus
Fatah-affiliated, confirm PCOM’s strong Hamas affiliation. One diplomat
(interviewed in February 2018) said that PCOM was the unofficial embassy of
Hamas in Kuala Lumpur. He blamed the Malaysian government, especially
former Deputy Prime Minister Hamidi, for its close cooperation with
PCOM and thus implicitly with Hamas.
The Islamist Hamas: Improving Reputation
Hamas cooperates in the pro-Palestinian TAN with Malaysian politicians
and PCOM. Its main interest is to improve its political reputation in Ma-
laysia, which has international repercussions, as well as impacts at the domes-
tic level in the Palestinian territories.
Within the TAN, Hamas openly touts its good relationship with the
Malaysian government, while it keeps its connection to PCOM hidden.
On its website (Hamas 2017b) and on media pages like the Palestinian
14. Interview: Representative of PCOM.
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Information Center (2016) and the Gaza-based newspaper Al-Risala (2017),
both known to be linked to Hamas, Hamas showcases its close relationship to
the Malaysian government, especially the UMNO. But these sources never
refer to PCOM, and very rarely to pro-Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia in
general. The same applies to Hamas’s senior member Mousa Abu Marzouq
(2015) and Political Bureau member Izzat al-Rishaq (2017). Both are active on
Twitter and mention Hamas’s good relationship with the Malaysian govern-
ment and Hamas’s visits to Malaysia, but never PCOM or the other pro-
Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia.
The relationship between Hamas and the UMNO has also strong impacts
on the relationship of the Malaysian government with the Palestinian Fatah.
Malaysia and Hamas have intensified official contacts since Malaysia’s then-
Prime Minister Najib Razak officially visited the Gaza Strip for the first time
in 2013, where a Hamas delegation, headed by then-Hamas-Prime Minister
Ismael Haniyeh, welcomed him. Razak’s trip was sharply criticized by Pales-
tinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s office in Ramallah, which said that the
visit to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip would worsen the political division
between the West Bank and Gaza and harm the legitimate representation of
the Palestinian people, that is, the Palestinian National Authority, headed by
Fatah (Ma’an News Agency 2013). Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zahri
rejected this criticism. He said that such visits would strengthen the stead-
fastness of the Palestinian people and break the siege of Gaza (Al-Risala 2013).
But Najib’s visit to Gaza did cause lasting damage to the relationship between
Fatah and the Malaysian government, especially the UMNO, as a represen-
tative of the Palestinian embassy in Kuala Lumpur confirmed to me in
a personal interview in February 2018. He said that a Fatah delegation went
to Cairo in 2013 and tried to prevent Razak, who wanted to enter Gaza via the
Egyptian crossing, from visiting the Strip, but Razak insisted. Since then, the
relationship between the UMNO and the Palestinian National Authority has
reached a nadir, and Mahmoud Abbas has not visited Malaysia in years.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Hamas and the UMNO has steadily
strengthened. In the same year Razak visited Gaza, Hamas officially visited
Malaysia for the first time. In December 2013, a Hamas delegation led by
Khaled Meshal, then head of its Political Bureau, arrived in Kuala Lumpur.
Hamas attended the UMNO’s 67th annual general assembly and met with
the Malaysian prime minister (PCOM 2013b, 4). Muslim Imran, chairman of
PCOM, said that the official Hamas visit to Malaysia would further
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strengthen their relationship. He added that the Malaysian government was
happy to receive a delegation from a movement of resistance to the occupa-
tion (referring to Israel), and that Hamas’s visit to Kuala Lumpur would aid
Malaysia’s role in supporting the Palestinian cause at the regional, Islamic,
and international levels (al-Adam 2013). Since then, Hamas has visited
Malaysia regularly and attended the UMNO’s general assembly in 2015,
2016, and 2017 (Hamas 2015, 2017b). In mid-2016, a Hamas delegation also
went to Malaysia to meet with the major opposition party, the Islamist PAS
(Hamas 2016).
Hamas itself displays its close relationship to the UMNO on its website,
and some members of the Political Bureau, like Izzat al-Rishaq, also refer to
it. But Hamas never refers to the third partner in the TAN, PCOM. In the
official Hamas documents not a single reference to PCOM can be found. Yet
Hamas’s documents and media reports show that Hamas and PCOM are
directly linked, and that PCOM represents Hamas in Malaysia. A Hamas
press release on its official visit to the Islamist PAS names Muslim Imran,
PCOM’s chairman, as a member of Hamas. But even this does not refer to
PCOM, only to Muslim Imran, as a representative of the Hamas movement
in Malaysia (Hamas 2016).
Two reasons could be suggested for why Hamas conceals its relationship to
PCOM. First, it is easier for PCOM to establish ties to Malaysian politicians
and Malaysian society as an officially registered NGO than as a Palestinian,
that is foreign, political organization. Second, this might be an attempt by
Hamas to prevent Israel from interfering with Hamas’s presence in Malaysia.
This seems to be even more likely considering the Palestinian electrical engi-
neering scientist, Fadi al-Batsh, who was a lecturer at the University of Kuala
Lumpur, and who was murdered in the Malaysian capital in April 2018. Some
reports suggest that the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, was behind the
assassination. According to a New York Times report, al-Batsh was part of
Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-din al-Qassam Brigades, and was accused
of researching and acquiring weapons and drones for Hamas (Beech and
Bergmann 2018). International media circulated photos of men in the Jabaliya
refugee camp in Gaza, where al-Batsh was from, holding posters issued by
Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades, praising al-Batsh as their martyr (Deutsche
Welle 2018; Zboun 2018). Hamas (2018c) also issued a press release eulogizing
one of its sons, “the martyr Dr. Engineer Fadi Muhammad al-Batsh.” The
assassination is evidence of the permanent presence of Hamas members in
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Malaysia and also shows the interlinkage between Hamas and PCOM. A photo
in the New York Times report shows Fadi al-Batsh’s funeral procession. Muslim
Imran, PCOM’s chairman, is among al-Batsh’s pallbearers, and another high-
ranking PCOM representative is walking closely behind him.
UMNO: Increasing Domestic Legitimacy by Supporting Hamas
The UMNO’s engagement in the pro-Palestinian TAN goes hand in hand
with Malaysia’s general support for the Palestinian cause, which has two
overall motivations. First, it follows the country’s tradition to strengthen the
emergence of “a just and safe international order, and to promote the struggle
against imperialism, racism and human misery” (Robani 2007, 42). For the
same reason, Malaysia also supported the struggle against apartheid in South
Africa, and the Muslims in Bosnia during the war of 1992–95 (42). Second,
and much more important, Malaysia’s support of the Palestinians is in line
with the domestic Islamization policies the UMNO has introduced and
promoted since the 1970s. At that time, the government also launched the
New Economic Policy, a comprehensive economic program, from which
especially the Muslim-Malay population benefitted, who had been econom-
ically disadvantaged vis-à-vis the Chinese and Indian ethnic minorities since
the founding of Malaysia in 1963.15 In promoting this policy, the secular
UMNO tried to increase its share of votes in the Muslim part of the society
and to set itself apart from the Islamist opposition party, PAS.
The UMNO and PAS, which have both used Islam to boost their legit-
imacy in the population and competed over which represents the true ortho-
doxy of Islam (Ufen 2009, 324), share common roots. In November 1951, in
pre-independence Malaysia, following a leadership struggle within the
UMNO, Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (Pan-Islamic Organization), a group
of ulama (religious scholars), imams, and national conservatives, emerged
as a splinter of the UMNO. This organization was later rebranded as PAS
(Noor 2014, 36–41). Although the UMNO and PAS have been opponents
since then, former Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein (Najib’s father)
brought PAS into the UMNO-led alliance, which became the BN in 1974
(82). The UMNO and PAS teamed up in the coalition for different reasons.
15. Under the name Federation of Malaya, Malaysia achieved independence from the United
Kingdom in 1957. In 1963, the British annexed Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah to the Federation of
Malaya and called the combination Malaysia. Then in 1965 Singapore left Malaysia.
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The UMNO wanted to secure its “claim to be the sole representative and
protector of the Malays” (Wong 2018, 760) after the May 1969 elections, in
which the UMNO-led alliance had lost many votes and which had been
followed by ethnic riots. PAS wanted to strengthen its power over the long
term and to promote the Islamic cause (Noor 2014, 82–83). The alliance
between the UMNO and PAS was short-lived. PAS left the BN in 1977,
after its power base had eroded in Kelantan, the home state of PAS’s then
leader, Asri Muda (92–95).
Since then, the UMNO and PAS have been archrivals, competing for
votes. Given this rivalry, it was especially during Mohamad Mahathir’s first
incumbency (1981–2003) that the UMNO introduced state-led Islamization
policies to unify the Muslim Malay population vis-à-vis the minorities (Ufen
2009, 321; see also Kheng 2002; Yong 2008). Mahathir also increasingly used
Islam as a foreign policy tool and aligned Malaysia along international Islamic
issues (Robani 2007, 62–63). He also made sure that the Palestinian issue
received more attention in politics and society (64–68). PAS also turned more
to the realm of global political Islam, which was on the rise following the
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Witnessing the success of more radical
groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah, PAS’s global orientation shifted toward
a more radical Islamist stance (Noor 2014, 121–23), and PAS started to present
itself as a radical alternative to the modernist Islamist approach of the
UMNO (Wong 2018, 764).
After the 2008–09 Israel–Gaza war, UMNO politicians started to support
the emerging pro-Palestinian NGOs in Malaysia. Deputy Prime Minister
Hamidi played a special role in the relationship between the UMNO and the
pro-Palestinian NGOs, especially PCOM. According to the PCOM repre-
sentative I interviewed, PCOM opened its office in Malaysia at the direct
request of Hamidi. Since then, Hamidi has served as an advocate and sup-
porter of PCOM in Malaysia. He has attended almost all the larger events it
organized, and also met high-ranking Hamas politicians, usually accompa-
nied by PCOM chairman Muslim Imran.
Each year PCOM invites the Palestinian community in Malaysia to take
part in the Grand Iftar, which PCOM has organized since its inception.16
16. Iftar is the breaking of the fast that takes place every evening after sunset during Ramadan,
the ninth month of the Muslim lunar calendar. During Ramadan, Muslim believers fast from dawn
to dusk. It is the only month named in the Qur’an. For more, see Esposito (2003a, 2003b).
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Leading Malaysian politicians from different parties, and also pro-Palestinian
NGOs, take part. Since the early days of PCOM, Ahmad Hamidi has served
as a kind of a patron during these celebrations, as the invitation to the 2012
event shows. In it, PCOM (2012) invites the Palestinian community in
Malaysia to “its 2nd annual grand iftar . . . with the presence of representatives
from the Malaysian government, political parties, NGOs and organizations.”
PCOM clearly states that it organized the celebration “under the auspices of
his Excellency Dato’ Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi (Minister of Defence
Malaysia, PCOM).” Hamidi’s special status in the relationship between
PCOM and the UMNO is further demonstrated by his active roles in the
Grand Iftar celebrations. At the fifth annual Grand Iftar, Hamidi participated
in a roundtable on stage in front of the general audience. Muslim Imran,
PCOM’s chairman, and Abdul Latiff Mirasa, member of PCOM’s board of
trustees and chairman of the Restu Foundation in Malaysia, which works for
the preservation and revival of Islamic art, were the other panelists (PCOM
2015b). Hamidi also gave a speech at this event (PCOM 2015c).
In the relationship between the UMNO and Hamas, PCOM serves as
a link or a broker. At every occasion when members of the UMNO and
politicians from Hamas have come together in Malaysia, PCOM, and
especially its chairman, Muslim Imran, was present as well. Other political
parties also have relationships with PCOM, but the UMNO has the clos-
est, although the PCOM representative I interviewed for this study tried to
put it differently. He said that PCOM has good contacts with various
political parties. He said that the relationships are based on a common
interest in the Palestinian cause and that this common interest helps
PCOM neither take sides in Malaysian politics nor create tensions between
Malaysian political parties. PCOM’s sole aim is to maintain a focus on the
Palestinian issue.
Taking a closer look at PCOM’s interactions with political parties in
Malaysia, a different picture emerges. PCOM has some contacts with PAS,
which became apparent when PCOM’s chairman, Muslim Imran, met with
PAS as a member of a Hamas delegation to Malaysia in 2016, as noted above.
However, this is the only contact between PCOM and PAS that appeared in
the media coverage on PCOM and on PCOM’s own website and its social
media platforms before the 2018 general election. Moreover, the PCOM
representative I interviewed remained quite vague when referring to PCOM’s
contacts with different political parties and refused to mention any names.
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CONCLUSION
In Malaysia, a pro-Palestinian transnational advocacy network has emerged
since the war between Israel and Gaza in 2008–09. Pro-Palestinian NGOs
close to Hamas, the Malaysian UMNO, and Hamas itself are involved. The
common transnational cause of the TAN is the liberation of Palestine and the
struggle against Israel. All actors involved in it openly advocate for this cause.
At the same time, each of the three actors uses the network to follow its own
interests.
First, there is the pro-Palestinian NGO, PCOM. It is officially registered
as an NGO in Malaysia but is co-opted by Malaysian politicians. Thus, it is
not independent from politics. Officially, PCOM works for the Palestinian
cause in Malaysia and focuses on advocacy. Unofficially, PCOM represents
Hamas in Malaysia. It works to improve Hamas’s links to Malaysian politi-
cians and the Malaysian population and to strengthen the relationship
between Hamas and Malaysia.
Second, there is Hamas. Hamas engages in the TAN to improve its
international reputation and legitimacy. It uses PCOM to strengthen its
relationship to Malaysian officials, especially those in the UMNO. Expand-
ing its international relationships gives it leverage in its power struggle with
the Palestinian Fatah. Hamas’s relationship with Malaysia weakens Fatah’s
status as the internationally recognized representative of Palestinian territo-
ries. This has repercussions for the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah
at the domestic Palestinian level.
Third, there is the Malaysian UMNO. It engages in the TAN, although
the Malaysian government generally restricts political NGOs and especially
fears the influence of foreign powers. The UMNO engages in the TAN
because this network supports the UMNO’s overall policies. The UMNO
uses the Palestinian cause and the pro-Palestinian TAN to strengthen its own
reputation in the Malaysian population. It tries to use the Palestinian cause as
an Islamic issue to increase its popularity in the Muslim Malay population, its
traditional support base.
The future of the pro-Palestinian TAN in Malaysia seems to be stable,
barring path-breaking changes in the political landscape. Although PCOM
(and thus implicitly Hamas) seemed to be very close to the UMNO via
PCOM’s patron, former Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Hamidi, after the
2018 general Malaysian elections and the UMNO’s ouster from power, the
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pro-Palestinian TAN still seemed to be stable. This became apparent during
PCOM’s 8th Grand Iftar, held on June 9, 2018, when the new government
was already in power. At the Iftar, Ahmad Hamidi was replaced as PCOM’s
patron by the new deputy prime minister, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. Hamidi
did not take part. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail gave a keynote speech (Ismail
2018) and exchanged views with high-ranking PCOM members (PCOM
2018f). That PCOM was able to replace its long-term partner Hamidi just
a month after the elections and the subsequent unprecedented power shift,
shows how well PCOM (and implicitly Hamas) are connected with politi-
cians in Malaysia. How it was possible for PCOM to switch alliances so
quickly is not clear. One can assume, however, that then-Prime Minister
Mahathir provided the link for PCOM to the new government and also to
Ismail, of the People’s Justice Party. Mahathir, a former member of the
UMNO, has always been an important patron of PCOM. In 2011, he was
the one who gave a speech and honored PCOM at the organization’s launch-
ing ceremony (PCOM 2011). His support for PCOM goes hand in hand with
his support for the Palestinian cause and the Islamization policies he pursued
in Malaysia during his first incumbency. Thus, it is likely that Mahathir
provided the link between PCOM and the new administration.
The pro-Palestinian TAN in Malaysia offers new insights into TANs in
a non-Western region. This research demonstrates that TANs can involve
state actors and NGOs at the same time. It also shows that the actors in the
pro-Palestinian TAN in Malaysia concentrate on the Palestinian cause as
a global issue, but do so from a bottom-up perspective; that is, they are trying
to strengthen advocacy and awareness for the Palestinian cause in Malaysian
society and politics. Finally, it shows that the Palestinian cause, as the official
shared issue of the pro-Palestinian TAN in Malaysia, provides a frame of
reference in which the actors interact and cooperate to pursue their respective
and individual political interests.
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[Hamas delegation concludes its visit in Malaysia]. Accessed July 20,
2018. (http://hamas.ps/ar/post/5573).
Hamas. 2017a. “A Document of General Principles and Policies.” Accessed
August 17, 2018. (http://hamas.ps/ar/uploads/documents/06c77206ce9
34064ab5a901fa8bfef44.pdf).
Hamas. 2017b. “Senior Hamas Delegation Meets the Malaysian Prime
Minister.” Accessed August 27, 2018. (http://hamas.ps/en/post/1089/
senior-hamas-delegation-meets-the-malaysian-prime-minister).
Hamas. 2018a. “After Abbas’ Threats, Hamas Stresses Israeli Occupation Is the
Main Cause of Gaza Suffering.” Accessed August 3, 2018. (http://hamas.ps/
en/post/1214/after-abbas’-threats-hamas-stresses-israeli-occupation-is-the-
main-cause-of-gaza-suffering).
Hamas. 2018b. “Mesh’al Calls for World Countries to Undermine US
Embassy Plan.” Accessed August 3, 2018. (http://hamas.ps/en/post/1192/
mesh’al-calls-for-world-countries-to-undermine-us-embassy-plan).
Hamas 2018c. “Biyan suhufi naiyan lil shahid al-alam fadi al-batsh” [Press
release for the international martyr Fadi Al-Batsh].
Hamidi, Ahmad Zahid (@Zahid_Hamidi). 2017. “Himpunan solidariti per-
dana: intifada selamatkan #baitulmuqaddis di masjid putra, putrajaya.”
(Inaugural Solidarity Gathering: Intifada rescues #holiestsites Putra
Mosque, Putrajaya). Twitter, December 22; Accessed July 19, 2018.
(https://twitter.com/Zahid_Hamidi/status/944156139008094208).
772  ASIAN SURVEY 60:4
Harun, Ruhanas. 2009. “In Pursuit of National Interest: Change and
Continuity in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East.”
Jurnal Antarabangsa Kajian Asia Barat / International Journal of West
Asian Studies 1, 23–38.
Hooi, Khoo Ying. 2013. “The NGO-Government Relations in Malaysia:
Historical Context and Contemporary Discourse.” Malaysian Journal of
Democracy and Election Studies 1:1, 76–85.
Ismail, Muhamad Takiyuddin, and Abdul Muein Abadi. 2017. “Stiftungen
and Political Education in Malaysia: The Role of Germany’s Democracy
Assistance.” Asian Survey 57:3, 548–70.
Ismail, Saifuddin Nasution. 2018. “The 8th Annual Grand Iftar with the
Palestinian Community in Malaysia / PCOM / Program Tentative.”
Facebook, June 9; Accessed August 12, 2018. (https://www.facebook.
com/saifuddin.nasution/photos/a.468413206503639/1909109812433964/).
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press.
Kheng, Cheah Boon. 2002. Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Khoo, Gaik Cheng. 2018. “Malaysia.” In Akihiro Ogawa (ed.), Routledge
Handbook of Civil Society in Asia (Abingdon: Routledge), 143–59.
Koss, Maren. 2018. Resistance, Power, and Conceptions of Political Order in
Islamist Organizations: Comparing Hezbollah and Hamas. London:
Routledge.
Leon, Trinna. 2017. “PM Najib Leads Third KL Rally against Jerusalem Move.”
Straits Times, December 22; Accessed June 9, 2018. (https://www.straitstimes.
com/asia/se-asia/pm-najib-to-lead-third-kl-rally-against-jerusalem-move).
Ma’an News Agency. 2013. “Abbas Office Criticizes Malaysia Premier Visit to
Gaza,” January 22. Accessed August 22, 2018. (https://www.maannews.
com/Content.aspx?id¼558454).
Middle East Monitor. 2017. “Senior Hamas Delegation Meets Malaysia PM,”
December 7; Accessed July 15, 2018. (https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20171207-senior-hamas-delegation-meets-malaysia-pm/).
Milner, Anthony. 2017. “Malaysia in 2016: Sharpening Political Fault Lines.”
Asian Survey 57:1, 173–79.
Muslim Imran. 2015. “Speech of Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia
(PCOM) Chairman, Iftar 2015.” YouTube video; Accessed August 25,
2018. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼yXJI_0fcyxY).
KOSS / MALAYSIA’S PRO-PALESTINIAN ADVOCACY NETWORK  773
Muslim Imran (@muslimbinimran). 2017a. “Preparations Friday Rally.”
Twitter, December 20; Accessed July 19, 2018. (https://twitter.com/
muslim4islam/status/943536528688537600).
Muslim Imran (@muslimbinimran). 2017b. “On the Way to the Meeting
with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Abd Al-Razak.” Twitter, December
8; Accessed August 5, 2018. (https://twitter.com/muslim4islam/status/
939065318298738693).
Muslim Imran (@muslimbinimran). 2017c. “Sayidun bijou al-ichwan al-
hubbyin dr. abu java bahar salah wa al-ach abu umar izzat al-rishaq by-
nama fi kuala lumpur” [Happy to have the beloved brothers Abu Jawad
Maher Saleh and brother Abu Umar Izzat Al-Rishaq with us in Kuala
Lumpur]. Twitter, December 6. Accessed August 10, 2018. (https://
twitter.com/muslim4islam/status/938381332207435776).
Muslim Imran (@muslimbinimran). 2018a. “Picture from the Archive with
the commander of the Mujahid Abu Abid Ismael Haniyeh.” Twitter,
January 10; Accessed August 5, 2018. (https://twitter.com/muslim4islam/
status/951359267277127680).
MyCare. 2018. “Introduction.” Accessed June 29, 2018. (http://www.mycare.
org.my/about-us/introduction/).
Nair, Shanti. 1997. Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. 1st ed. London:
Routledge.
Noor, Farish A. 2014: The Malaysian Islamic Party 1951–2013: Islamism in
a Mottled Nation. Amsterdam University Press.
Palestinian Information Center. 2016. “Hamas Delegation Arrives in
Malaysia to Attend UMNO Conference.” Accessed August 27, 2018.
(https://english.palinfo.com/news/2016/12/02/Hamas-delegation-arrives-
in-Malaysia-to-attend-UMNO-conference).
Palestinian Information Center. 2017. “Save Al-Quds Campaign of Malaysia
Calls for Protecting Aqsa.” Accessed August 2, 2018. (https://english.
palinfo.com/news/2017/7/16/save-al-quds-campaign-of-malaysia-calls-for-
protecting-aqsa).
PCOM (Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia). 2011. “Launching cer-
emony of PCOM by his Excellency Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.”
YouTube video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼iZhIifUwXkY).
PCOM. 2012. “The 2nd Annual Grand Iftar / PCOM 2012.” Facebook.
Accessed August 12, 2018. (https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set¼a.
239926002795178.52032.202466786541 100).
774  ASIAN SURVEY 60:4
PCOM. 2013a. “Malaysia and Palestinian Cause: PCOM Concludes Its Visit
to Gaza.” Palestinian Weekly Report, no. 30, February 6.
PCOM. 2013b. “Mishaal Concludes Visit to Malaysia.” Palestinian Weekly
Report, no. 73, December 13.
PCOM. 2014. “An Introduction to the Palestinian Question.” Accessed
August 27, 2018. (http://pcomalaysia.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Introduction-to-the-Palestinian-Question.pdf).
PCOM 2015a. “Hamas Delegation First Moments in KL.” Accessed July 15,
2018. (http://pcomalaysia.com/hamas-delegation-first-moments-in-kl/).
PCOM. 2015b. “The 5th Annual Iftar with the Palestinian Community in
Malaysia / Moments of Happiness and Brotherhood / Roundtable.”
Facebook. Accessed August 12, 2018. (https://www.facebook.com/
pcomalaysia/photos/a.773571152763991/773579452763161/).
PCOM. 2015c.“The 5th Annual Iftar with the Palestinian Community in
Malaysia / Moments of Happiness and Brotherhood / Speech Hamid.”
Facebook. Accessed August 12, 2018. (https://www.facebook.com/
pcomalaysia/photos/a.773571152763991/773571229430650/).
PCOM. 2017a. “Advocacy and Activism in the Malaysian Context.”
Facebook. Accessed August 10, 2018. (https://www.facebook.com/
events/161401364425925/).
PCOM. 2017b. “PCOM Organize Palestine Advocacy Week.” Accessed
August 10, 2018. (http://pcomalaysia.com/pcom-organize-palestine-
advocacy-week/).
PCOM. 2018a. “An Introduction to: Palestinian Cultural Organization
Malaysia.” Accessed July 15, 2018. (http://pcomalaysia.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Introduction-to-the-Palestinian-Cultural-Organization-
Malaysia.pdf).
PCOM. 2018b. “Election Dato’ Saifuddin Nasution Ismail Board of Trustees
PCOM.” Twitter, July 6; Accessed August 20, 2018. (https://twitter.com/
pcom_malaysia/status/1014880977372438528).
PCOM. 2018c. “After Abbas’ Threats, Hamas Stresses Israeli Occupation Is
the Main Cause of Gaza Suffering.” Accessed August 3, 2018. (http://
pcomalaysia.com/after-abbas-threats-hamas-stresses-israeli-occupation-is-
the-main-cause-of-gaza-suffering/).
PCOM. 2018d. “Mesh’al Calls for World Countries to Undermine US
Embassy Plan.” Accessed August 3, 2018. (http://pcomalaysia.com/
meshal-calls-for-world-countries-to-undermine-us-embassy-plan/).
KOSS / MALAYSIA’S PRO-PALESTINIAN ADVOCACY NETWORK  775
PCOM. 2018e. “Is Israel about to start a new War on Gaza?” Accessed July 7,
2018 (http://pcomalaysia.com/is-israel-about-to-start-a-new-war-on-gaza/).
PCOM. 2018f. “PCOM 8th Annual Grand Iftar.” Facebook. Accessed
August 12, 2018. (https://www.facebook.com/pcomalaysia/photos/a.
1660140724107025/1660141170773647/).
Salleh, M. A., M. R. M. Nor, M. Abu-Hussin, A. Mohamed, M. L. Yusob,
and N. A. Nazri. 2017. “The Role of Malaysian NGOs on Palestinian
Issues: Aqsa Syarif Berhad.” Pertanika Journals Social Science & Humanities
25: 133–42.




Rane, Halim. 2010. Islam and Contemporary Civilisation. Melbourne
University Press.
Robani, Anidah Binti. 2007. “Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy: A
Pragmatic Approach.” International Journal of Muslim Unity 5:2, 41–75.
Trump, Donald. 2017. “Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem.”
White House, December 6. Accessed July 7, 2018. (https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-
jerusalem/).
Ufen, Andreas. 2009. “Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia
Compared.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47:3, 308–33.
Ufen, Andreas 2013. “Introduction. The 2013 Malaysian Elections: Business
as Usual or Part of a Protracted Transition?” Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs 32:2, 3–17.
Uhlin, Anders 2016. Civil Society and Regional Governance: The Asian
Development Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Viva Palestina Malaysia. 2016. “Viva Palestina Malaysia 2009–2016.” Petaling
Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan.
Viva Palestina Malaysia 2018a. “Prime Minister, Dr Ismail Haniyeh.”
Accessed July 6, 2018. (http://www.vpm.org.my/images/projects_in_
gaza/light_up_gaza/Page_13.jpg).
Viva Palestina Malaysia 2018b. “Committee Members.” Accessed August 20,
2018. (http://www.vpm.org.my/about-us/committee-members).
776  ASIAN SURVEY 60:4
Weiss, Meredith Leigh. 2006. Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and
Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia. Stanford University Press.
Weiss, Meredith L., and Saliha Hassan. 2003. “Introduction: From Moral
Communities to NGOs.” In Meredith L. Weiss and Saliha Hassan (eds.),
Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs, 1st ed.
(London: Routledge), 1–16.
Wong, Chin-Huat 2018: “The Rise, Resilience and Demise of Malaysia’s
Dominant Coalition.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs 107:6, 755–69.
Yong, Tai Tan. 2008. Creating “Greater Malaysia” : Decolonization and the
Politics of Merger. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Yunus, Arfa, and Fairuz Mohd Shahar. 2017. “Najib, Hadi to Lead Rally
Next Friday to Protest US Move on Jerusalem.” New Straits Times,
December 15; Accessed August 20, 2018. (https://www.nst.com.my/
news/nation/2017/12/314777/najib-hadi-lead-rally-next-friday-protest-us-
move-jerusalem).
Zboun, Kifah. 2018. “Hamas Member Fadi Al-Batsh Assassinated in Kuala
Lumpur, Accusations Pointed at Mossad.” Asharq Al-Awsat, April 22.
Accessed August 25, 2018. (https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/
1245636/hamas-member-fadi-al-batsh-assassinated-kuala-lumpur-
accusations-pointed-mossad).
Zeiger, Asher, and AP. 2013. “Malaysian Prime Minister Makes Gaza Visit.”
Times of Israel, January 22. Accessed August 10, 2018. (https://www.
timesofisrael.com/malaysian-prime-minister-makes-gaza-calling/).
Ziinine A.S. 2017. “Khairy: Donald Trump Should Respect the International
Law.” Malaysia World News, December 9. Accessed July 18, 2018. (https://
www.malaysiaworldnews.com/2017/12/09/khairy-donald-trump-should-
respect-the-international-law/).
KOSS / MALAYSIA’S PRO-PALESTINIAN ADVOCACY NETWORK  777
